|
Mutual Assured Destruction
The doctrine assumes that each side has enough weaponry to destroy the other side and that either side, if attacked for any reason by the other, would retaliate with equal or greater force. The expected result is an immediate escalation resulting in both combatants' total and assured destruction. It is now generally assumed that the nuclear fallout or nuclear winter would bring about worldwide devastation, though this was not a critical assumption to the theory of MAD.
The doctrine further assumes that neither side will dare to launch a first strike because the other side will launch on warning (also called fail-deadly) or with secondary forces (second strike) resulting in the destruction of both parties. The payoff of this doctrine is expected to be a tense but stable peace.
The primary application of this doctrine occurred during the Cold War (1950s to 1990s) in which MAD was seen as helping to prevent any direct full-scale conflicts between the two power blocks while they engaged in smaller proxy wars around the world. It was also responsible for the arms race, as both nations struggled to keep nuclear parity, or at least retain second-strike capability.
Proponents of MAD as part of U.S. and USSR strategic doctrine that believed nuclear war could best be prevented if neither side could expect to survive (as a functioning state) a full scale nuclear exchange. The credibility of the threat being critical to such assurance, each side had to invest substantial capital even if they were not intended for use. In addition, neither side could be expected or allowed to adequately defend itself against the other's nuclear missiles. This led both to the hardening and diversification of nuclear delivery systems (such as nuclear missile bunkers, ballistic missile submarines and nuclear bombers kept at fail-safe points) and to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
This MAD scenario was often known by the euphemism "nuclear deterrence" (The term 'deterrence' was first used in this context after World War II. Prior to that time, its use was limited to juridical terminology). In France, "deterrence" was translated as "dissuasion", and in Russia, it was translated as "terrorization"—a linguistic difference which highlights two particular interpretations of deterrence: one which is basically an extrapolation of rational politics, another which is based on pure emotional fear. These two notions of deterrence, and MAD, were often used interchangeably by both fans and foes of the doctrine, despite their apparent paradoxical intent.
In McNamara's formulation, MAD meant that nuclear nations either had first strike or second strike capability. A nation with first strike capability would be able to destroy the entire nuclear arsenal of another nation and thus prevent any nuclear retaliation. Second strike capability indicated that a nation could promise to respond to a nuclear attack with enough force to make such a first attack highly undesirable. According to McNamara, the arms race was in part an attempt to make sure that no nation gained first strike capability.
An early form of second strike capability had already been provided by the use of continual patrols of nuclear-equipped bombers, with a fixed number of planes always in the air (and therefore untouchable by a first strike) at any given time. The use of this tactic was reduced however, by the high logistic difficulty of keeping enough planes active at all times, and the rapidly growing role of ICBMs vs. bombers (which might be shot down by air defenses before reaching their targets).
Ballistic missile submarines established a second strike capability through their stealth and by the number fielded by each Cold War adversary - it was highly unlikely that all of them could be targeted and preemptively destroyed (in contrast to, for example, a missile bunker with a fixed location that could be targeted during a first strike). Given their long range, high survivability and ability to carry many medium- and long-range nuclear missiles, submarines were a credible means for retaliation even after a massive first strike.
The multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) was another weapons system designed specifically to aid with the MAD nuclear deterrence doctrine. With a MIRV payload, one ICBM could hold many separate warheads. MIRVs were first created by the United States in order to counterbalance Soviet anti-ballistic missile systems around Moscow. Since each defensive missile could only be counted on to destroy one offensive missile, making each offensive missile have, for example, three warheads (as with early MIRV systems) meant that three times as many defensive missiles were needed for each offensive missile. This made defending against missile attacks more costly and difficult. One of the largest U.S. MIRVed missiles, the LG-118A Peacekeeper, could hold up to 10 warheads, each with a yield of around 300 kilotons. The multiple warheads made defense untenable with the technology available, leaving only the threat of retaliatory attack as a viable defensive option.
The original doctrine of U.S. MAD was modified on July 25, 1980 with U.S. President Jimmy Carter's adoption of countervailing strategy with Presidential Directive 59. According to its architect, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, "countervailing strategy" stressed that the planned response to a Soviet attack was no longer to bomb Russian population centers and cities primarily, but first to kill the Soviet leadership, then attack military targets, in the hope of a Russian surrender before total destruction of the USSR (and the USA). This modified version of MAD was seen as a winnable nuclear war, while still maintaining the possibility of assured destruction for at least one party. This policy was further developed by the Reagan Administration with the announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (known derisively as "Star Wars"), the goal of which was to develop space-based technology to destroy Russian missiles before they reached the USA.
SDI was criticized by both the Soviets and many of America's allies (including Margaret Thatcher) because, were it ever operational and effective, it would have undermined the "assured destruction" required for MAD. If America had a guarantee against Soviet nuclear attacks, its critics argued, it would have first strike capability which would have been a politically and militarily destabilizing position. Critics further argued that it could trigger a new arms race, this time to develop countermeasures for SDI. Despite its promise of nuclear safety, SDI was described by many of its critics (including Soviet nuclear physicist and later peace activist Andrei Sakharov) as being even more dangerous than MAD because of these political implications.
Acronyms
ABM : Anti-Ballistic Missile. Missiles designed to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles. Can also refer to the ABM treaty, signed by Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev, which halted the development and use of such systems due to fears that such systems could counter the MAD scenario and, thereby, increase the likelihood that an ABM protected country would use their nuclear weapons aggressively.
ALCM : Air Launched Cruise Missile.
Ballistic missile : A missile using a ballistic trajectory involving a significant ascent and descent including suborbital and partial orbital trajectories.
Cruise missile: A missile using a low altitude trajectory intended to avoid detection by radar systems. Cruise missiles have shorter range and lower payloads than ballistic missiles, usually, and are not known to carry MIRVs.
BMEWS: Ballistic Missile Early Warning Site
DEFCON: Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON 5 is the peacetime state; DEFCON 1 is a maximum war readiness).
GLCM: Ground Launched Cruise Missile.
ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.
INF: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, signed in 1987, which eliminated tactical ("battlefield") nuclear devices and GLCMs from Europe.
MAD : Mutual assured destruction. The doctrine of preventing nuclear war by creating a situation in which any use of nuclear weapons would result in the certain destruction of both the attacker and the defender.
MIRV: Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles, nuclear devices carried, usually ten or twelve at a time on a single ICBM, allowing a single launched missile to strike a handful of targets, and allowing a few missiles to strike several targets redundantly.
PAVE PAWS: Precision Acquisition of Vehicle Entry Phased-Array Warning System
SALT I : Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. A treaty signed by Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev in 1972, limiting the growth of US and Soviet missile arsenals.
SALT II: A treaty designed to further limit the growth of US and Soviet missile arsenals.
SDI : Strategic Defense Initiative, more commonly known as Star Wars. A system proposed by Ronald Reagan to use space-based systems to detect, intercept and destroy ICBMs and MIRVs. Criticized for its costs, doubts that it would be effective, and concerns that it would violate the ABM treaty and offset MAD, it was not supported by the Congress of the United States at that time.
SIOP: Single Integrated Operational Plan
SLBM: Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile.
SLCM: Submarine Launched Cruise Missile.
START : STrategic Arms Reductions Treaty - A treaty proposed by Ronald Reagan to reduce the numbers of missiles and warheads.
START II : A treaty signed by George H. W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin in January 1993 to ban the use of MIRVs.
|
